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Abstract
The digital domain is the emerging environment for which the internet and data
connectivity exists. This new domain is challenging the traditional place for geopolitics to exist,
and creating new challenges to international relations. The use of cyberweapons through direct
cyberattacks, such as the possibility of an attack on the U.S. power grid, or misinformation
campaigns, such as the one launched by Russia against the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, can
expand the international threat landscape. While these new threats increase, states are widely not
prepared to address the new challenges in the digital domain. This paper will use three primary
sources and a variety of secondary sources to analyze the aspects of cyberwarfare, how to
effectively secure nations against threats from the digital domain, and how developing versus
developed countries react differently to advances in technology.
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Introduction
Why it’s Important to Study Cyberspace in the context of geopolitics
While geopolitics has been advancing and tackling new challenges for centuries, the
development of a cyber domain is creating a new space for geopolitics to exist. The cyber
domain in the context of geopolitics refers to the use of the internet or digital operations in
achieving one’s political agenda. While many security and diplomatic experts address the need
for digital strategies in combating disinformation and cyberweapon campaigns, there is little
discussion on how this domain will shift the area of geopolitics. It is necessary to look at the
totality of what geopolitics encompasses, from economic means to security, in order to better
understand how the cyber domain will expand international relationships.
While during our time in Switzerland we studied a variety of geopolitical issues such as
migration, terrorism, economic security, etc, there was only one lecture on the digital domain and
it focused on the diplomatic side of international studies. I want to focus my research project on
how geopolitics is shifting due to the increase in cyberweapons and how this will impact spaces
in geopolitics. I expect my paper to highlight how much of the world is unprepared to address
cyberweapons and their impact on geopolitics.

The Focus of the Study
While it is important to cover all relevant material relating to the geopolitical sphere of
the digital domain, I will be touching on the following aspects to keep my study brief. First, there
will be a discussion of the definition of geopolitics and how cyber weapons are challenging this
definition. Next, it is necessary to define what are the most threatening cyber-attacks to
international security with a case study on the U.S. power grid. Following that there will be a
5

section on who are the actors participating in the digital domain. After, there will be an analysis
of the cybersecurity aspects of this new space and how the European Union is creating
incohesive cybersecurity policies. Next, a discussion on the economics of the digital domain will
be presented to reveal how developing and developed countries are impacted differently by this
space. Finally, the paper will end with insight on what the future for the digital domain will look
like, specifically focusing on recommendations for securing the cyber sphere. Overall, this paper
will answer how the space for geopolitics is being impacted by the digital domain and it will
provide recommendations for how to handle this new space in international relations.

Literature Review
The literature surrounding the digital domain and geopolitics often is limited in its scope
of focus. While there are a variety of publications available, a large portion does not specifically
mention geopolitics. Additionally, most of the literature available focuses strictly on one aspect
of the digital domain, such as economics, security, or the type of warfare used. There is a little
amount of literature that looks at the digital domain from a holistic stance, considering the wide
array of aspects impacting cyber space.
However, a large number of publications on the digital domain and geopolitics come
from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Technology Policy Program,
International Security Program, and Strategic Foresight Group. The most important recent CSIS
pieces of literature that relate to my ISP topic include Cyber Solarium and the Sunset of
Cybersecurity, Economic Impact of Cybercrime, Russia’s Attacks On Democratic Justice
Systems, and Has Europe Lost Both the Battle and War over Its Digital Future? These reports
use a data-driven approach to understanding the issues facing the digital domain today.
6

In addition to CSIS, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), an Israeli-based
think tank has a “Cyber, Intelligence, and Security” program that highlights new developments
in cyberspace. The INSS Cyber, Intelligence, and Security releases a report every month about
the most relevant developments impacting cyberwarfare, with the most recent addition being The
Secret War of Cyber Influence Operations and How to Identify Them. These reports look past the
case by case basis of cyber conflicts and look to compare traditional means of military tactics to
cyberwarfare.
Relevant literature surrounding this topic also includes reports released by governments
on the issue of cybersecurity. Specifically, the White House released a report entitled, The Cost
of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy. This report highlights the risks of a cyberattack to the United States, while also describing the United States’ policies surrounding
cybersecurity.
The theoretical approach in this study will compare historical geopolitical spaces to
modern cyberwarfare. In addition to defining geopolitics and how historically it has been used,
the project will address the new issues that arise with the advancement of technology. In general,
the study aims to address how technology and cyberweapons are shifting the space of
geopolitics. While wars have been fought in a variety of spaces—air, land, and sea—the cyber
domain creates another space for geopolitics with new problems to address.

Research Methodology
This research project includes both primary and secondary sources to help develop an
analysis of how the digital domain is shifting geopolitics. The primary sources utilized include
three different interviews with experts based in Europe. One of these interviews was conducted
7

in person in Brussels, Belgium and the other two were accomplish through phone calls due to the
coronavirus pandemic. These experts come from a variety of backgrounds including experience
with artificial intelligence, European Union cybersecurity policies, digital diplomacy,
cyberwarfare, misinformation campaigns, and general knowledge of how geopolitics are being
impacted by cyber tools. In addition to the primary sources, there is also the use of secondary
sources to complement the primary sources used. To draw from the best and more accurate
sources, the University of Michigan library database that allows students access to thousands of
scholarly articles online was referenced. Since the paper includes three expert interviews, there
was also a consultation with the CYBERSEC Forum that happened in March of 2020. While this
conference was supposed to be in person, a digital version was produced and published to
YouTube. The paper references this conference in a variety of sections to gain a better
perspective of European approaches to cybersecurity strategies.
The study primarily used qualitative analysis methods to analyze the primary and
secondary sources presented in the development of the research question. The largest aspects of
qualitative analysis that were used include interviews and content analysis to better understand
relevant narratives around the topic. While the majority of the paper was done through
qualitative analysis, there was a significant amount of secondary quantitative analysis tools. For
example, Gallup polls and statistical modeling was presenting as a way to support arguments, but
the analysis was done by a secondary source.
In terms of the ethical considerations of this study, there were a variety of considerations
necessary to align with the guidelines of the School for International Training (SIT). First,
throughout the expert interviews, an acknowledgment of the rights of the subjects was necessary
to address and a clear path for open communication was established. Additionally, in presenting
8

and processing relevant data to the study, acknowledging and accurate presentation of sources
was necessary. Finally, before beginning the study, an application to the SIT ethical review
board was completed regarding the use of human subjects.

Definitions and the Analytical/Theoretical Framework
There are a variety of terms that can be used to describe how the internet and digital
connectedness of the globe is impacting geopolitics. While many of the terms refer to similar
concepts or items, there are some differences that should be noted prior to reading the analysis
section of this paper. The digital domain refers to the internet, connection of cyber tools, and any
software that exists in the cloud. Often, when using the phrase digital domain, it refers to the new
sphere created for geopolitics to exist with the advancement of technology. Cybersecurity is the
aspect of protecting the digital domain from adversaries. Cyber weapons are any cyber tools that
have been created to cause disruption or harm to an actor. Cyber space is similar to the digital
domain in referring to the sphere created by technological development. Geoeconomics is the
economic trends of countries and how they relate to other nations. Finally, cyber warfare is how
states and non-state actors utilize cyber tools to cause destruction.

Defining Geopolitics and its Historical Space
Historically, geopolitics has been defined as “the interactions between political processes
and geographic spaces, not as a separate social science but as an interdisciplinary method of
analysis” (Csurgai 2019). The most important aspect of this definition is the aspect of
“geographic spaces”, representing the traditional means of geopolitics occurring in physical
spaces such as land, air, and sea. The tangible aspects of geopolitics such as natural resources,
9

geographical configuration, and the geography of populations have historically contributed to the
relationship between geopolitics and space. One of the most important developments of the early
21st century was the rapid commercialization of air space. From 1970 to 2001, airline passengers
increased by 1.345 billion passengers carried every year (Air transport, passengers carried 2001).
The commercialization of the air domain for geopolitics advanced swiftly, allowing the space to
be a target for actors to achieve political goals. This was mostly seen in the events of 9/11, where
a terrorist organization utilized this new space in geopolitics. In comparison, a similar but larger
development in the space of geopolitics today is occurring with the creation of a cyber domain.
The cyber domain is adding a new space for geopolitics to exist, creating a relationship
between political processes and the digital sphere. Over 4.39 billion people are currently online,
which demonstrates a rapid increase in users from the creation of the world wide web in 1990.
However, it is not just users on the internet, digital tools are now a part of every part of modern
society. This new space creates a variety of new developments for geopolitics, ranging from
security implications to economic incentives. In general, the cyber domain does not solve or
delay current geopolitical conflicts, but rather “the Internet seems to multiply and complicate
them” (Douzet 2014). Due to the creation of this new domain in which geopolitics exists, it is
necessary to examine the impact cyber will have on the future of international relations.
While the cyber domain is impacting geopolitics in a variety of ways, it is important to
understand it is the means of international relations, not the underlying interests that are being
impacted. James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights
this impact in noting that “despite the digital revolution, the strategic interests and objectives of
states remain unchanged for the time being” (Douzet 2014). With the advancement of the
internet and cyber tools, the means of geopolitics is shifting, but the motivating factors of nation10

states remain the same. The new means of geopolitics that the cyber domain has created have led
to a significant amount of new threats to international security, including cyberweapons,
misinformation campaigns, and economic warfare. These threats will be addressed in future
sections, specifically how actors and countries are responding to the shift of geopolitics in
cyberspace.

Actors and Aspects of Cyberwarfare
Non-State Actors
There is an increased amount of actors now participating in the digital domain and while
the realities of cyberwar are seen more as a future than an immediate threat, “one of the most
remarkable elements of past cyber events is the substantial involvement of non-state actors”
(Bussolati 2015). For these groups, the digital domain became a place to spread their political
ideologies and utilize “digital weapons—cheap, powerful, and easy to use, to obtain, or to
manufacture” (Bussolati 2015). A variety of non-state actors are able to use the digital domain to
achieve their objectives, including individual hackers, criminal organizations, cyber mercenaries,
or hacktivists (Bussolati 2015). Some of the largest successful hacks, such as the 2007 Estonian
denial of service attack, have been committed by non-state hacking groups (Bussolati 2015).
These groups have increasingly turned to digital tools to achieve their objectives due to the
anonymity of cyberweapons and ease of access to these resources. A recent study estimates that a
low-end cyberattack that costs just $34/month could return $25,000 a month to the hacker
(Friedman 2016). In addition, these low-cost cyberattacks can advance the political agenda of a
non-state actor in a variety of ways. While there are many ways non-state actors are utilizing the
digital domain, some barriers exist to full access to cyber tools by these groups.
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State Actors
In comparison to non-state actors, state actors are taking a different approach to utilize
cyber tools in the digital domain. There are three areas that states are focusing on to tackle
threats in the digital domain—public/private partnerships, collaborations across states, and
understanding the diversity of threats—however, there are many areas for states to improve in
these categories.
First, since the digital domain relies so heavily on private companies creating new
advancements, states will be at the forefront of technological development if there is a focus on
public-private partnerships (Duberry 2020). If states are able to collaborate with private
companies to lead the advancements occurring in the digital domain, they will always have the
advantage over non-state actors of utilizing these resources first and developing security
measures to protect against these advancements. However, there is little cooperation existing
between the public and private sectors for a variety of reasons (Increasing International
Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms 2018). Primarily, the lack of an
information-sharing platform between the public and private sectors creates disparities in
technological development between states and companies (The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity
to the U.S. Economy). Additionally, states struggled with sharing information about their cyber
strategies to the public, out of fear adversaries will use it to their advantage. It was not until the
Trump administration took office in 2017 that the United States publicly displayed the pillars of
their cybersecurity strategy (The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy). This
lack of transparency made it more difficult for private companies to work with the public sector
in advancing the cybersecurity capabilities of the federal government.
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Next, as non-state actors act alone in separate groups with little collaboration, states are
creating partnerships to ensure protection against cyberweapons. Global cyberattacks, such as the
WannaCry ransomware attack of 2017 on civilians that locked people out of their devices until a
sum is paid to the hacker, created the understanding that international cooperation is necessary to
fight these non-state actors (Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting
Cyber Norms 2018). Not only do global attacks allow countries to understand the security threat
cyberattacks create to their citizens, but the WannaCry attack cost over $1 billion dollars and
demonstrated the economic impact non-state actors can have using cyberweapons (Increasing
International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms 2018). Legislation across
the European Union has been enacted to create uniformity in cybersecurity policies, but there are
still significant gaps in these regulations that expose states to cyberattacks (Fantin 2020). There
will be a significant discussion on the lack of uniformity in the EU cybersecurity policy later in
the paper.
Finally, there is some concern about the diverse amount of security threats that are
created in the cyber domain and the ability of states to be prepared to face these threats. While
other spaces for geopolitics to exist have widely remained constant in their threats, the digital
domain is developing more rapidly than ever seen before (Duberry 2020). Instead of being
natural-born like air, land, and sea, the digital domain is man-made, allowing people to have the
power to change and advance it (Duberry 2020). One of the more recent threats that the digital
domain has produced is the advancement of misinformation campaigns being spread on social
media. Cognitive warfare such as these misinformation campaigns is having a large impact on
geopolitics and international relations as a whole.
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How the U.S. Power Grid Represents Vulnerabilities in the Digital Domain
In addition to cyberspace transforming the geopolitical landscape, the cyber weapons
used now create new threats to international security. Not only is the cyber domain shifting how
we understand international relations and expanding our understanding of geopolitical spaces,
but the development of digital weapons creates more advanced threats to our civilizations. One
of the largest concerns is the “protection of vital infrastructures, which if disrupted or sabotaged
could endanger civilian populations” (Douzet 2014). In a highly digitized society where basic
security requirements and natural resources rely on the cyber domain, there is an increased
geopolitical threat to citizens (Dincic 2020). The largest example of a vulnerable aspect of
infrastructure includes the digitalization of the power grid across the globe, more specifically the
United States’ power grid is especially vulnerable to an attack by an adversary.
Specific vulnerabilities in the U.S. power grid system demonstrate how hackers could
gain access and control over the North American power grid. The power grid is initially designed
to protect itself from natural disasters or cyber-attacks because it is broken up into 4 sections
across North America. However, if adversaries can take offline 9 substations out of the 55,000 in
the United States, the U.S. could suffer coast to coast blackouts lasting 18 months or more (U.S.
Risks National Blackout From Small-Scale Attack 2014). In March 2019, a cyber-attack on
critical power centers demonstrated the specifics of how an attack can harm U.S. infrastructure.
The cyber-attack in March 2019 attacked parts of the power grid in California, Wyoming,
and Utah using a vulnerability in the network’s firewall (Report reveals play-by-play of first U.S.
grid cyberattack 2019). The utility’s firewall censored data flow from the grid’s generator sites
to the utility’s control center. The hacker utilized this vulnerability to reboot the firewall over
and over, eventually breaking the software and making operators lose contact with the generator
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sites and the control center. These glitches lasted for around 10 hours, but power was never lost
to any of the power grid sections (Report reveals play-by-play of first U.S. grid cyberattack
2019). There is evidence that the attacker was most likely using an automated bot to scan the
internet for vulnerable devices and did not know it had infiltrated the utility’s network.
Future attacks could happen similarly to the cyber-attack that occurred in March 2019,
but there are also other ways an adversary could infiltrate the North American Power Grid (The
Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy 2018). According to the White House,
adversaries could target laptops of key personnel with access to multiple power plants, physically
enter locations that monitor the power grid network, or hack a remotely accessed control system.
Additionally, the White House fears phishing attacks against the power grid’s corporate network
to infiltrate the system and then use a pivoting attack to ultimately access the control system (The
Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy 2018). All these methods expose
vulnerabilities to the North American Power Grid that could allow adversaries to cripple the U.S.
and have major impacts on Americans.
An attack on the North American Power Grid could have large effects on the U.S.
economy, health and human rights of U.S. citizens, and threaten national security. First, the
economic impacts can be seen through the largest power outage in U.S. history in 2003 that
impacted the Midwest, Northeast, and parts of Canada. This outage was because of a human
programming error with indirect and direct damages costing a total of $6 billion (Emerging Risk
Series, Business Blackout 2015). Recent estimates project that a cyber-attack on critical U.S.
infrastructure could cause economic damages up to $1 trillion (Emerging Risk Series, Business
Blackout 2015). In addition to economic implications, a cyber-attack could cause health and
safety concerns for U.S. citizens. A power outage would impact heating and cooling for homes
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and food supplies, limit the supply of clean water without power for the treatment pumps, and
create a fuel shortage in hospital generators (The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S.
Economy 2018). All of these implications could cause severe illness and death in the U.S.
Finally, 85% of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) energy comes from commercial services and
a power outage would greatly impact the defense of the United States (The Cost of Malicious
Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy 2018). The DoD would be unable to perform routine
protections against adversaries to secure the U.S. The impact of a cyber-attack to the North
American Power Grid would have severe financial, humanitarian, and national security
implications on the United States.

Misinformation Attacks
The rapid expansion of social media has led to a new geopolitical threat to states across
the globe. As of January 2020, there were over 3.8 billion social media users across the world
(Digital in 2020). This new platform has connected the world in incredible ways, from fueling
the Arab Spring to giving people in underdeveloped countries access to the internet. However,
with the rise of social media, there is also a rise in geopolitical threats that face societies. Across
the globe “many countries use cyberspace, and specifically social media, to manage cyber
influence operations as part of holistic information warfare” (Tayouri 2020). These
misinformation campaigns serve a variety of purposes and they are not the first time influence
operations have been utilized in warfare, “a close term to cyber influence in the military context
is influencing maneuver, which is the process of using operations to get inside an enemy’s
decision cycle or even forcing that decision cycle to direct or indirect actions” (Tayouri 2020).
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While these types of operations have appeared in military tactics before, misinformation
campaigns in the digital domain create a vast array of new threats to geopolitics.
The most prominent and impactful use of misinformation spread on social media came
from Russian forces beginning in 2014 all the way up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.
Specifically, the hackers deployed “social media trolls and bots to spread online content that
undermines faith in democracies and their institutions” (Spalding 2019). This campaign had a
large impact on civil society with approximately 126 million people being reached through
Russian posts on Facebook during the 2016 presidential election (Spalding 2019). These posts
were not simply in support of one candidate over another for President of the United States,
Russia was pursuing “an attack on public trust and confidence” and questioning the functionality
of western democratic institutions (Spalding 2019). This misinformation was meant to target
certain populations in the United States such as African-Americans, immigrants, far-right
activists, and liberal thinkers. The main goal of targeting these groups was “to amplify an
existing divide within the American public” (Spalding 2019) and create distrust in democratic
institutions. An important impact of this misinformation campaign was that it allowed the United
States to understand the critical role elections play in the country. Following the discovery of
Russian interference in the 2016 election, the Obama administration designated the election
infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector in the United States (Johnson 2017). By
drawing larger attention to the election infrastructure, this designation is vital to protecting the
United States’ election against misinformation in the future.
These types of misinformation campaigns are impactful for a variety of reasons, but two
being the mistrust in America’s media and the use of social media as a means of receiving the
news. In 2018, only 21% of Republicans stated they had “a great deal” or even “a fair amount”
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of trust in America’s media (Jones 2018). This demonstrates the ability for right-wing citizens in
the U.S. to not believe the mainstream media and become more likely to trust misinformation
campaigns on social media. In addition to the mistrust in America’s media, a large amount of
Americans are receiving their news on social media platforms. In 2018, around 68% of
Americans said they have used social media in some form to receive news (News Use Across
Social Media Platforms 2018). This shift in using online platforms to receive news about the
world is allowing misinformation to spread more easily and reach a larger array of people.
Overall, misinformation campaigns create a large threat to geopolitics and relations between
states, especially with the increased use of social media platforms.

Security
Challenges in Cybersecurity
One of the most important aspects of the digital domain is creating comprehensive
cybersecurity policies to protect against cyber weapons. Compare to previous spaces in
geopolitics, such as air, land, and sea, the digital domain creates more challenges in security.
Governments across the globe are rapidly increasing security efforts to account for the threats in
this shifting domain. Specifically, the United States increased funding by $800 billion for cyber
defense in 2013 and the US Cyber Command will see an increase from 900 to 4,900 employees
in the coming years (Douzet 2014). This rapid expansion and investment in cybersecurity
demonstrate the increased risks to nations from cyberweapons. However, with a new domain
being developed for geopolitics to exist in, there is also an increasing amount of issues with
cybersecurity regulations.
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Case Study—European Union and Cybersecurity Challenges
With recent developments in technology, cybersecurity is an important aspect of
protecting societies against the harmful weapons in the digital domain. Since the cyber domain is
a relatively unexplored territory for legislation, there is an opportunity to develop a sustainable
framework for uniform cybersecurity regulations across countries. However, international
organizations such as the European Union (EU) have struggled to create cohesive cybersecurity
policies across their member-states for a variety of reasons (Fantin 2020).
First, many member-states in the EU see cybersecurity as impacting domestic policy and
thus infringing on the sovereignty of the states (Fantin 2020). According to the United States,
there are 16 critical sectors that will be impacted by cybersecurity regulations (Critical
Infrastructure Sectors 2020). These sectors include a wide range of industries ranging from
energy, to finance, to food and agriculture (Critical Infrastructure Sectors 2020). The diverse
range of industries that are impacted by cybersecurity demonstrates how issues can arise in
regulating a variety of sectors. There is then a repeat of a very common question within the EU,
how can you protect the sovereignty of states while advancing security? This digital and political
clash will continue to create issues in creating cohesive strategies for cybersecurity in the EU.
Additionally, similar to the United States, EU member-states are struggling to share
cybersecurity strategies. Specifically, “given the sensitive nature of the technology, the sharing
of capacities is perceived as giving up sovereignty and what it can reveal about strengths and
weaknesses” (Douzet 2014). Not only is there a lack of transparency within the EU, but there are
also significant disparities in the cyber tools developed by member-states. Throughout the EU,
many experts have found “disparities in capabilities are very wide” with nations that have the
“most advanced capabilities view them as an area of national sovereignty and give priority to
19

cultivating bilateral arrangements” (Douzet 2014). In order to improve cybersecurity policies, the
EU must follow the transparency of the United States in sharing its security policy.
Finally, there is a race for artificial intelligence across Europe which impacts the ability
to create a cohesive cybersecurity strategy (Fantin 2020). There is a general sentiment that if you
can be the first nation to master artificial intelligence, then you will dominate the geopolitical
rise of this new technology (Fantin 2020). New developments in artificial intelligence will serve
to shape political processes and relationships among powers (Technology Alliances Response to
Geopolitical Tensions 2020). However, the competitive nature of artificial intelligence makes the
EU member-states less inclined to regulate this market (Technology Alliances Response to
Geopolitical Tensions 2020). Since European countries are not only in competition with each
other but also are in competition with nations across the globe such as the United States and
China, fewer governments are concerned with the security aspects of this technology and are
more concerned with developing at a fast pace.

Economics
The Cost of Cybercrime
The digital domain is not only having an impact on the security of nation-states, but there
are significant economic implications of cybercrime. In 2014, it was estimated that $445 billion
was lost every year to cybercrime (Lewis 2018). By 2018, that number jumped to $600 billion,
nearly one percent of global GDP (Lewis 2018). While hacking in a relatively cheap way to
attack an adversary, costing as little as less than $100, there is often a large economic return. The
financial gains from hacking generally come from the monetization of digital data, or creating
ransomware attacks that ensure users will pay to retrieve their stolen data (Lewis 2018).
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Specifically, the countries most impacted by cybercrime are the nations with higher a GDP or
more advanced technological development, reflecting that “the richer the country, the greater its
loss to cybercrime is likely to be” (Lewis 2018). Due to a larger amount of technological
development, these nations are a larger target for cybercrime and consequently pay a larger price.
In addition to the economic burden the digital domain creates for more developed countries,
there are also differences in access to cyber tools between nations across the globe.

The Digital Divide
Since the rapid development of the digital domain, the creation of a digital divide has
been introduced to nations. The digital divide represents how countries with varying economic
resources are impacted differently to advancements in the digital domain. With a low barrier to
entry and relatively low cost of resources, the digital domain shows some promise of allowing
developing countries to participate in the technological rise (Dincic 2020). Specifically, the
digital economy is able to include a variety of nations “by lowering transaction costs, addressing
information asymmetries and exploiting economies of scale and network effects” (Dahlman,
Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). There are a variety of platforms and digital tools that are aiding
the connectedness of developing countries to the digital domain, with one example being
Ushahidi.
Ushahidi is an African software platform that looks to help victims in global
emergencies. This platform is using technology to collect information at a high speed from the
grassroots of African countries (Dincic 2020). The technology was originally developed in 2008
in Kenya following an increase in post-election violence to locate safe-havens for citizens
(Ushahidi: The African Software Platform Helping Victims in Global Emergencies 2013).
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However, the platform has expanded significantly to the Middle East and Asia to crowdsource
information on violence and natural disasters (Ushahidi: The African Software Platform Helping
Victims in Global Emergencies 2013). Ushahidi is a relevant example of how the developing
world can utilize technology to advance the countries’ connectedness and streamline effective
communication.
There are also some challenges presenting in the engagement of the digital domain with
developing countries. The digital divide can refer to the fact that many of the technological
advancements occurring in developed countries “depend on a basic level of infrastructure that
many emerging economies still lack” (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). It is estimated
that “approximately two thirds of the world’s population does not have access to the Internet.
These 4.3 billion people generally live in rural, geographically dispersed areas” (Dahlman,
Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). Access to the internet is the more basic form of infrastructure
needed to participate in the digital domain, but the majority of the world lacks internet
connectivity. Even if developing countries are able to obtain this basic infrastructure, there will
be a delay in their ability to implement these new technologies. This delay will allow developed
countries to create the regulatory structure and form the digital frameworks for the globe, putting
developing countries at a disadvantage (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). For this
reason, it is recommended that developing countries “engage in strategic planning to maximise
the development impact of digitalization” (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016). If the
developing world is to gain significantly from the digital domain, there needs to be a
collaboration with the developed economies to ensure digital frameworks reflect the needs of all
nations.
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There are also some challenges for the developed world to engage with the digital
domain. Specifically, in many OECD countries, there is significant growth in a select amount of
large companies at the expense of smaller ones (Dincic 2020). These companies are creating
monopolies on the technology market, especially with the increase in company mergers and
buyouts that consolidate parts of the tech industry (Dahlman, Mealy, and Wermelinger 2016).
Since these companies hold a significant share of the market concerning technological
advancements, they have the ability to restrict government involvement in the development of
the digital domain. However, there is hope for a public-private partnership in the United States
with the expansion of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). This
institution serves “as a facilitator of knowledge-sharing and coordinator of research activities
undertaken by various parties” which allows the federal government to promote advancement in
developing technologies and encourage competition in the private sector (Dahlman, Mealy, and
Wermelinger 2016). In funding initiatives such as DARPA, countries are able to decrease the
hold large technology companies may have on the advancement of the digital domain.

Conclusion
The Future of Cyberwarfare
The digital domain is having a significant impact on geopolitics, specifically focusing on
international security and geoeconomics. The vast amount of technological advances is creating
new areas for adversaries to act, specifically exposing vulnerabilities in the digitization of energy
and social media is allowing state and non-state actors to pursue misinformation campaigns. The
example of the United States’ power grid demonstrates how increasing digital tools in a
country’s infrastructure can leave states exposed to large cyber-attacks. Additionally,
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misinformation campaigns can weaken public confidence in federal institutions and create
divisions between state populations. There are also large disparities in how nations are
addressing the geoeconomic implications of the digital domain. In cyberspace, developing and
developed countries are experiencing vast differences in access to digital tools and this could
lead to gaps in who is positively impacted by the digital domain.
Overall, there are a variety of questions that remain unanswered with how nations will
address the increasing geopolitical threat of the digital domain. Specifically, since the cyber
domain is man-made unlike past spaces for geopolitics to exist, it is constantly changing and
advancing. Without public-private partnerships between states and companies, federal
governments and international organizations are not prepared to understand the rapid
developments produced in the digital domain. Additionally, there are large gaps in securing the
digital domain which could lead to vulnerabilities in international security. Countries need to
create cohesive and collaborative cybersecurity regulation in order to combat the adversaries
attempting to pursue cybercrimes. While the digital domain is advancing at a historic speed,
nation-states may not be ready for the implications of cyberspace on geopolitics. The world is
seeing a revolutionary shift in geopolitics and the “beginning of a growing period of dominance
of cyberspace in international relations”, but governments across the globe often lack the tools to
effectively regulate this new domain (Popa 2014).

Abbreviation List
SIT=School for International Training
EU=European Union
U.S.=United States
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DARPA= Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
OECD=Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
CSIS=Center for Strategic and International Studies
DoD=Department of Defense
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